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I. INTRODUCTION
Access to knowledge is fundamental for thriving in a digital
economy and digital society.1 We live in an era of unprecedented
access to online materials and can instantly access movies on Netflix,
browse books on Google Books, and listen to numerous music clips
on YouTube. However, access to knowledge remains a major
challenge. Despite the fact that everything seems available online, it
is not “free” in a way that can ensure freedom. In fact, over the past
two decades, users’ freedom to access, experience, transform and
share creative materials has constantly declined.
Much of the content available online is locked behind paywalls.2
You cannot read the content without paying a fee or purchasing a
subscription.3 Full-time academic scholars, researchers and students
may not even notice these barriers. They rely on their institutional
subscriptions, which make most books and academic journals
available on their systems. But some research institutions, especially
outside the US and Europe, cannot afford the high subscription fees.
They may also be too expensive for many small universities or
NGOs.4 The same is true for individuals unaffiliated with universities
and businesses. What if, for instance, you or your relatives suffer
from a medical condition and you wish to learn more about it? You
will need to purchase several articles. A single copy of an article can
cost as much as $40. If you are a journalist, a freelance writer or an
independent blogger, you will most likely be denied access.
Businesses may purchase access to content, but if they expect to

1. See generally Amy Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge: A Conceptual
Genealogy, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
17, 20-21 (Gaelle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (arguing that
knowledge has become central to the global economy, and essential for economic
growth, human health and political activism).
2. See Manon A. Ress, Open Access to Publishing: From Principles to
Practice, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 475,
475-478 (Gaelle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (identifying the
increasing prices of serial-subscription costs accompanied with the decreasing
research-library budgets as one of the causes in the decline of access to
knowledge).
3. See id. at 477.
4. See John Bohannon, Who’s Downloading Pirated Papers? Everyone,
Science (Apr. 28, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/
04/whos-downloading-pirated-papers-everyone.

ELKINREVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE NEW FRONTIERS OF USER RIGHTS

10/24/16 3:45 PM

3

generate some income, from making that content available to others,
then they will also have to charge a fee to recover their investment.
This places further barriers on generating open content that is freely
available, and subsequently marginalizes the creation of noncommercial content by non-profit entities.
Yet, cost is not the only reason for the lack of freedom in access to
knowledge. Major developments in design are affecting access to
knowledge, including the transition to cloud computing and mobile
internet, the shift from copies to streaming, and facilitation by online
intermediaries.5 Consequently, much of the access to content that is
made available online, is shaped by the design, business models, and
technological measures exercised by online intermediaries. We are
often offered “free content” by online intermediaries, but “pay” with
our personal data. Users should be free to explore any cultural,
religious, professional, or political content without the monitoring by
third parties. Yet today, access to content posted online is often
subject to surveillance.
Overall, many of the threats facing access to knowledge lie
beyond copyright. This new phase in managing access to creative
content forces copyright to take the back seat, making room for more
powerful mechanisms that govern access to cultural works: the
design of online facilitating systems and contractual obligations.
These new challenges require a new thinking with respect to fair
use. Fair use is often considered essential for securing access to
knowledge.6 Fair use was enacted as a statutory standard in section
107 of the 1976 Copyright Act,7 authorizing the courts to consider
and weigh four factors when determining whether certain use of a
5. See Susan K. Sell, A Comparison of A2K Movements: From Medicines to
Farmers, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
391, 399-400 (Gaelle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (detailing
“preemptive measures” that make it illegal to perform acts associated with the
circumvention of technology that is designed to limit access to materials).
6. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2001) (“[T]he fair use right was codified to maintain the constitutionally
mandated balance to ensure that the public has access to knowledge.”) See also
Michael I. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law 12 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 817 (2010); Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer
Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of
Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1993).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
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copyrighted work is permissible without a license. This open-ended
nature of fair use gives courts discretion to evolve the law. The
flexibility rendered by this standard has certainly enabled U.S courts
to adjust exceptions and limitations to copyright in a rapidly
changing world.8 Many countries worldwide are seriously
contemplating adapting more flexible norms in order to address these
challenges.9 However, fair use alone might not suffice to
counterbalance the emerging challenges to access to knowledge.
An extensive study of enforcement practices pertaining to online
copyright infringements in Israel offers empirical evidence of the
impact of fair use in the digital era. Israel introduced fair use about a
decade ago in the 2007 Copyright Act.10 The study compared two
major enforcement strategies following the enactment of the law:
traditional court proceedings and Notice and Takedown procedures
implemented by online intermediaries. The findings suggest that
introducing a fair use provision in the statute might be an important
step, yet, this alone cannot safeguard access to knowledge. 11
Based on these findings, this Article argues that in order to secure
a sufficient level of free and unlicensed access to knowledge, it is
necessary to develop a more comprehensive approach to permissible
uses that would incorporate fair use in new and innovative ways. The
approach proposed in this Article is twofold: First, at the conceptual
level, fair use should be interpreted as a user’s right and not merely
an affirmative defense. Second, fair use should be incorporated into
online enforcement systems, by embedding fair use considerations in
the design.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II of this Article discusses
access to knowledge and analyzes emerging challenges in the online
setting. Part III presents empirical evidence of the impact of fair use
in two enforcement contexts - court proceedings and online
intermediaries. Part IV discusses the new frontiers of fair use. It
8. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014);
Authors Guild v. Google, 804 F.3d 202, 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
9. See, e.g., AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT NO. 122, COPYRIGHT
AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, (2014) (recommending that Australia would adopt a
flexible fair use copyright exception modeled after the United States statutory
provision on fair use).
10. Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH No. 2199, 34, §19 (2007) (Isr.).
11. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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demonstrates how an approach to fair use that focuses on user rights
could enhance fair use and secure access to knowledge.

II. FAIR USE AND NEW CHALLENGES TO ACCESS
TO KNOWLEDGE
A. ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge is undoubtedly a key for participating in the
information society. Access to knowledge is necessary for working
and competing in the information economy, for participation in civil
society, and for developing and enjoying culture.12 In addition, it is
no less important for active citizenship, making informed choices,
and taking part in the democratic political process.13
Access to knowledge involves freedom to access materials and to
read and learn from existing knowledge, as well as the freedom to
make use of content, rearrange it, change it, or invoke new meanings.
It also includes the freedom to engage in knowledge and to share
information with others in the course of conversations and
exchanges.14 Access to knowledge is clearly a necessary precondition to freedom. That is not simply because it is necessary for
self-expression, but because it is essential for a society that seeks to
diversify the sources of knowledge available to the public.15 When all
individuals can potentially speak out and be heard, thoughts and
views are less likely to be shaped by the governing “party line” or by
corporate speech.
Much of our thinking about access to knowledge in the digital era
assumes an environment of total availability, where users were
directly connected and could freely share content of their choosing
without any interference.16 The Access to Knowledge framework has
12. See William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1661, 1694-95 (1998).
13. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic
Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215,
216-17 (1996); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996).
14. NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 63 (2008).
15. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 565-66 (2004).
16. See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 26 COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 2
(2004).
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therefore focused primarily on free access to content and on the legal
barriers placed by copyright law on free access.17 Thus, “free access”
was essentially conceived as freedom to copy and download without
charge, but also as freedom to upload and share, and the freedom to
change and adapt.18 The steady expansion of copyright over the past
two decades has threatened to limit the freedom available to users.19
Consequently, efforts to secure access to knowledge have focused on
copyright barriers, seeking to expand Limitation and Exceptions
(L&E) to copyright, and advocating the introduction of new L&E or
more flexible norms that could mitigate the extensive scope of
copyright.20
Copyright law still plays a central role in shaping access to
knowledge affecting users’ ability to read, view or listen to materials,
to use and reuse original works, and to share them with others.21 One
example is the use of copyrighted materials for educational and
research purposes. Teaching often involves the use of copyrighted
materials. The unlicensed copying of works to make them available
to students in the course of teaching may constitute a copyright
infringement unless exempted under fair use.22 In recent years, the
scope of legitimate use of content for research and educational
purposes has become contentious.23 Many publishers of books,
17. See JEREMY MALCOLM, ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE FOR CONSUMERS:
REPORTS OF CAMPAIGNS AND RESEARCH 2 (Jeremy Malcolm ed. 2010).
18. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART & COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY 192, 249 (2008).
19. See generally JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE
COMMONS OF THE MIND 116-17 (2008).
20. See Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for
Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1175, 1228 (2010); see, e.g., BERNT
HUGENHOLTZ & MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, FAIR USE IN EUROPE - IN SEARCH OF
FLEXIBILITIES 10, 21 (2011).
21. See Tina Amirtha, The Open Publishing Revolution, Now Behind a BillionDollar Paywall, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 17, 2015, 2:30 PM),
http://www.fastcompany.com/3042443/mendeley-elsevier-and-the-future-ofscholarly-publishing.
22. See, e.g., William W. Fisher & William McGeveran, The Digital Learning
Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital
Age, 20-21 (Berkman Ctr. For Internet & Soc’y, Research Pub. No. 2006-09, 2006)
[hereinafter The Digital Learning Challenge].
23. The scope of fair use for educational purpose was also a matter of
controversy prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act. See WILLIAM F.
PARTY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985) (discussing the
debate over educational use).
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academic journals, and newspapers have adjusted their business
models to facilitate online delivery.24 Academic publishers are
introducing “paywalls,” that range from strict, where every access to
content is subject to payment, to more flexible options, where some
content is freely available (“soft,” “leaky,” or “freemium”).25
Publishers have also exercised copyright to combat online sharing of
scientific articles and the making available of excerpts for
educational purposes.26 For instance, in a recent lawsuit filed by
major academic publishers against Georgia State University (GSU),
the publishers claimed that copies stored in the university’s
electronic course reserve system, which offered web access to
excerpts from books and journals to the students enrolled in the
course, violated their copyright.27 GSU asserted that making these
copies was within the boundaries of fair use.28 The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit held that GSU might be liable for uploading
excerpts of copyrighted books to its electronic course reserve system,
as fair use analysis should always be performed on a work-by-work
basis, “taking into account whether the amount taken—qualitatively
and quantitatively—was reasonable in light of the pedagogical
purpose of the use and the threat of market substitution.”29
At the same time, however, some courts offered a fairly broad
24. See Amirtha, supra note 21 (emphasizing that digital sales have become a
major source of revenue for the publishing industry. For instance, in 2014,
Elsevier, one of the big four academic publishers, representing over 3000 academic
journals, listed a profit of $1.1 billion on revenues of 3.1 billion, largely by selling
individual research papers and journal subscriptions).
25. Id. (explaining that some free content is funded by advertising, or becomes
available following an embargo period, and that publishers have engaged in data
collection, seeking to leverage their exclusive control of content).
26. See Elsevier v. Sci-Hub, No. 1:15-CV-04282, Compl. ¶ 1, 5, 6 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (detailing Elsevier’s recently filed complaint against the Library Genesis
project and Sci-Hub.org search engine); see also Amirtha, supra note 21
(discussing Elsevier also exercising its copyright in 2013 in order to put pressure
on the open science social network, Mendeley, to remove access to any scientific
articles published in one of its many academic journals. This pressure eventually
led to the acquisition of the startup company. Elsevier demanded that abstracts
from the API, and PDF previews be removed, claiming copyright infringement.
After the acquisition, Elsevier’s materials are now fully available on the system).
27. See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir.
2014).
28. Id. at 1242.
29. Id. at 1283.
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interpretation of fair use, which permits important educational and
scientific uses. In the case of Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, for
example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled on a
digital library containing digitized versions of the library collections
of partnering universities, holding that systematic digitization of
copyrighted books by universities for the purpose of search was fair
use.30 The court found that full-text searchable database, which
returns the book name and page number for matching search results,
was transformative, since the copies served a different purpose than
the original works.31 These recent rulings demonstrate the advantage
of fair use in allowing the court to enable new, innovative uses of
copyrighted works, thus advancing the goals of copyright.
Similarly, in Canada, which follows the more rigid legal standard
of fair dealing, the Supreme Court recently expanded the breadth of
education-related purposes that qualify as fair dealing.32 The court
formulated a broad definition of private study that includes copies
made by teachers for students’ use.33 In another decision, the
Canadian Supreme Court broadly interpreted research to include
sampling during consumer research for online purchase of music.34
But challenges to access to knowledge are no longer limited to
copyright alone. Copyright law, which has been at the forefront of
the access to knowledge campaign over the past two decades, now
seems to be taking a back seat as emerging forces that limit free
access come into play. These arising challenges are further discussed
in the next section.

B. NEW FRONTIERS IN ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE
Copyright is no longer the sole form of constraint on access to
knowledge. Limitations on access to digital materials are linked to
30. See Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, supra note 8.
31. Id.
32. See Alberta (Educ.) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access
Copyright), [2012] 2 S.C.R. 345, 362 (explaining that “the word ‘private’ in
‘private study’ should not be understood as requiring users to view copyrighted
works in splendid isolation. Studying and learning are essentially personal
endeavors, whether they are engaged in with others or in solitude”).
33. See id., at 362.
34. See generally Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can.,
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (Can.).
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major shifts in design, emerging business models, and changes in
alliances and interests as a result.
The rise of cloud computing and mobile internet has facilitated a
fundamental shift in content delivery, as the distribution of copies is
replaced with streaming and access services. The distributed network
architecture of open access and total availability of content, which
has characterized the evolution of the internet since the early 1990s,
enabled every user connected to network to store, upload, and
directly share content with other users of the network. This
distributed design, is now being sidelined by a more centralized and
closely-monitored environment in which use is no longer anonymous
(e.g., mobile internet, social media) and content delivery is stored on
the cloud rather than in end nodes. Consequently, management and
control over the storage and delivery of content in this environment
is centralized.35
A second technological shift that affects access to knowledge is
the method of delivering content. Instead of delivering copies of
content, cloud computing and mobile internet make it possible to
offer content as services. Rather than buying printed books, records,
CDs, or DVDs, users can purchase all-you-can-eat access
subscriptions to music, books and movies, which are made available
online through streaming technology. Netflix, Spotify, and Google
Books are just a few examples. This shift facilitates ongoing
technical control over the use and distribution of copyrighted
materials. Users no longer control a physical copy of the material and
their access to the content may expire at any time. This weakens
users and limits their ability to choose how to use content and
whether to share it.36
The result is a more centralized infrastructure, which enables
control over data, content, applications and users. It shifts power
from the end nodes to central operators. The shift to cloud computing
has placed knowledge and cultural products (software, books,
35. Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145
DÆDALUS, 18 (2016).
36. A striking example of the lack of user control, in the shift to streaming, is
the case of Amazon; Amazon.com apologized and settled a class action suit for
violating its terms of service by remotely removing purchased copies of George
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) from Kindles. See Brad Stone, Amazon
Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2009, at B1.

ELKINREVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10

10/24/16 3:45 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[32:1

academic articles, music and videos) beyond the physical control of
the end-user. The availability of content in online platforms such as
Facebook or YouTube is governed by the platform, which shapes
what becomes available, and which content will be removed.37
Decisions on what to upload and download, what to watch, and what
could be shared and how – are increasingly governed by publishers
and online intermediaries.
The use of content and the terms of accessing the content will
often be defined by a license or contractual provisions of the
facilitating platform’s Terms of Use.38 Much of the content
distributed online is subject to licenses, and many restrictions on
users’ freedom to access and use copyrighted materials are
contractual. 39 Under licenses, users are often defined as non-owners
of a copy of the work - as “licensees” - and the license often sets
limits on the right to resell the accessed copy.40 Some EULAs restrict
permissible use to designated reading devices (e.g., iBooks for iPad),
or permit the making of only a limited number of backup copies.41
Another dimension affecting the availability of free access is
market structure. Access to knowledge is facilitated by a handful of
online intermediaries (mega-platforms) with significant market
power in a market with strong economies of scale.42Online
intermediaries such YouTube, Facebook, and Google often converge
control over content, access, and distribution channels and control of
end users’ personal data.43 This may inhibit consumers’ choices and
37. Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone
Ever
Finding
Out,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(June
2,
2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/117878.
38. See B.J. Ard, Notice and Remedies in Copyright Licensing, 80 MO. L. REV.
313, 322 (2015).
39. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT,
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 10-12 (2011) (discussing problems
associated with pervasive boilerplate agreements in modern society).
40. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir.
2010).
41. See David R. Hansen, A State Law Approach to Preserving Fair Use in
Academic Libraries, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 32-33
(2011).
42. Nicolai Van Gorp & Olga Batura, Challenges for Competition Policy in a
Digitalised Economy, EU Doc. No. IP/A/ECON/2014-12 (2015).
43. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL
ROLE
OF
INTERNET
INTERMEDIARIES
9
(2010),
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weaken competitive pressure.
Access facilitated by intermediaries is shaped by their business
models. First, online intermediaries increasingly profit from selling
content.44 Emerging business models also generate revenues from
content through alliances with right-holders. Aside from facilitating
communication among end-users or offering new distribution
channels to publishers, online intermediaries have also become
publishers, producers, distributors, and marketers of music, movies,
eBooks, and apps.45
Second, access to knowledge that mediated by online
intermediaries is often offered as a service, and is tied to an ongoing
contact of intermediaries with each user through a variety of content
services (e.g., search, display, internet access, content access).
Online intermediaries profit from data extracted from users who
access content services.46 Data collection on users’ interests and
online behavior creates a stream of revenue from targeted
advertising.47 Data and data-related services have become an

https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf [hereinafter OECD]. See
Niva Elkin-Koren, After Twenty Years: Revisiting Copyright Liability of Online
Intermediaries, in THE EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM IN OF COPYRIGHT IN THE
DIGITAL AGE (Susy Frankel & Daniel J Gervais eds., 2014).
44. See id.
45. See Greg Bensinger, Amazon to Begin Producing, Acquiring Original
Movies,
WALL
STREET
J.
(Jan.
19,
2015
3:20
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-to-begin-producing-acquiring-originalmovies-1421687531 (revealing that YouTube and Amazon are investing in the
production of original movies); see also Pricing Page for Amazon Kindle Direct
Publishing, AMAZON, https://kdp.amazon.com/help?topicId=A29FL26OKE7R7B
(last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (offering another example in Amazon’s Kindle Direct
Publishing (KDP) that offers authors a whole range of self-publishing options
through the Amazon Kindle Store); Authors & Book Publishers: Frequently Asked
Questions, ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/working-itunes/sell-content/
books/book-faq.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (showing that authors can earn
seventy percent of the royalties from the sale of such books).
46. What Type of Content Can I Monetize, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.
com/youtube/answer/2490020?hl=en (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (stating that
online intermediaries, such as YouTube, offer free content in exchange for
personal data).
47. Study Finds Behaviorally-Targeted Ads More Than Twice as Valuable,
Twice as Effective As Non-Targeted Online Ads, NETWORK ADVERTISING
INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/NAI_
Beales_Release.pdf.
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independent source of revenues.48 Data may also be collected
through playing devices (e.g., iPhone and Kindle).49 Widespread
monitoring and automated filtering by online platforms (e.g.,
YouTube Content ID) create further layers of protection that may
threaten users’ rights to privacy and freedom of expression.50
Access to Knowledge requires certain assurances of intellectual
privacy.51 Freedom from ongoing monitoring is necessary to protect
the intimate and private nature of the educational experience that is
essential for meaningful learning. Intellectual privacy is also
important for maintaining academic freedom52 and the freedom for
users to be actively involved in creating culture.53 Surveillance-free
access is not simply a matter of privacy but can also affect the ability
of user-authors to participate actively in the creative process by
generating and disseminating cultural works. Fear of monitoring may
48. Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of
an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75 (2015).
49. See Corynne McSherry, Adobe Spyware Reveals (Again) the Price of
DRM: Your Privacy and Security, ELECT. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 7, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/adobe-spyware-reveals-again-price-drmyour-privacy-and-security (providing examples in which digital distribution
involves built-in surveillance, such as the collection and storage of reading habits
and intellectual preferences when users download music, apps, and eBooks to
Smartphones and e-Readers, which turns formerly intimate and private experiences
into public knowledge. The author also asserts that built-in surveillance
exemplifies information collection methods, such as Adobe Spyware’s tracking
and reporting of Digital Editions reader habits, which illustrates the growing
concerns for reader privacy and security).
50. See Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated
Content Principles and the DMCA, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363, 388-90 (2009);
see also Ira S. Nathenson, Civil Procedures for a World of Shared and UserGenerated Content, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 911, 938 (2010).
51. See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387
(2008) (analyzing intellectual property with regard to the First Amendment and
concepts of privacy).
52. Monitoring the use of copyrighted materials for collecting royalties may
create a chilling effect on students and researchers who seek to explore different
types of content in private. Copyright could facilitate access to such data. For
instance, the plaintiff in the Georgia State University case the plaintiff sought
access to the e-Reserve system and the original records for the three year period at
issue in order to calculate royalties owed royalties. See Patton, supra note 27, at
1237.
53. See Richards, supra note 51, at 387 (arguing that a robust creative culture
requires intellectual privacy in which creators can develop ideas free from the
threat of their electronic distribution before showcasing them to the public).
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create a chilling effect, causing users to refrain from seeking specific
knowledge resources or reading particular materials for fear of their
interests being monitored and recorded.54 To promote creativity,
copyright law should encourage freedom to explore any cultural,
religious, professional, political, or other type of resource, without
the surveillance of third parties.55

C. BARRIERS TO ACCESS AND COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT BY
ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES
As data consumption shifts from copies to streaming, users lose
control over their data and applications as they are all stored on
remote facilities and are subject to the terms and conditions dictated
by an online provider. Indeed, Technological Protection Measures
(TPMs) and Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems, which
were perceived as the greatest threat to access to knowledge at the
end of the 90’s, did not prove useful for protecting copies of music
and software.56 Yet, online streaming, cloud computing, and mobile
internet strengthen the effectiveness of technological measures and
make algorithmic management of access much more robust. The
shift to cloud computing and streaming services put users at a
disadvantage. Users have become completely dependent on access
providers, who can terminate access to any material at any time.
Cloud computing and streaming services effectively dominate
mass distribution of content. Particularly, online intermediaries filter,
block, and disable access to copyrighted materials to minimize their
exposure to copyright liability.57 The Digital Millennium Copyright
54. Ernie Smith, Writers Group: Surveillance Having a Chilling Effect, ASS’N
NOW (Jan. 6, 2015), http://associationsnow.com/2015/01/writers-groupsurveillance-chilling-effect/ (revealing that fiction and nonfiction writers in fifty
countries expressed deep concern with surveillance and self-censored by avoiding
controversial topics in work or personal communications, which threatens
independent thinking by penetrating the intimacy of reading).
55. See Global Chilling: The Impact of Mass Surveillance on International
Writers, PEN AM. (Jan. 5, 2015), https://pen.org/global-chill.
56. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual
Property Protection: Technological Protection Measures and Section 1201 of the
United States Copyright Act, 16 INFO. & COMMC’N TECH. L. 191, 197 (2007)
(giving the example of RealNetworks in which its Player did not allow user
copying of music but its Server allowed ‘copy switching’ which enabled
unauthorized copying of music).
57. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use: Rights Matter, COPYRIGHT AT HARVARD
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Act58 (DMCA) conferred safe harbor protection for online
intermediaries that remove allegedly infringing content upon
receiving notice according to the Notice and Takedown (N&TD)
procedure defined by the law.59 While some online intermediaries
simply implement the DMCA safe harbor provisions, others go
beyond the statutory requirements and apply voluntary measures to
filter, block or remove certain content for various business purposes
(“DMCA-Plus”).60 YouTube’s Content ID is a classic example. The
YouTube Content ID system has turned the algorithmic
implementation of N&TD into a business opportunity by offering a
platform that generates profit from DMCA-Plus services for
YouTube and its business partners.61 Content ID allows copyright
owners to identify their works using a digital identifying code.62 The
system then notifies subscribed copyright holders whenever a video
that matches content that they own is uploaded to YouTube.63 System
subscribers are then given four options: (1) mute audio that matches
their music; (2) block a whole video from being viewed; (3)
monetize the video by running ads against it; or (4) track the video’s
LIBRARY (Feb. 26, 2016), https://blogs.harvard.edu/copyrightosc (arguing that
false-positive removals of non-infringing materials threaten access to knowledge).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999).
59. See infra note 129.
60. Annemarie Bridy, Comment, Copyright’s Digital Deputies: DMCA-Plus
Enforcement by Internet Intermediaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE LAW (forthcoming 2016).
61. See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond
Transparency in Algorithmic Enforcement (July 26, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741513 (arguing for more accountability in
algorithmic systems of online enforcement; see also Statistics, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016)
(demonstrating that content ID currently scans over 400 years-worth of video and
utilizes more than 25 million reference files of more than 5,000 partners, including
US network broadcasters, record labels, and movie studios).
62. Content ID employs digital fingerprinting to sample an uploaded file and
compare it against a database of reference files provided by participating copyright
owners. See Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, New Weapon in Web War over Piracy,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2007, at C1 (discussing fingerprinting technologies for
identifying audio and video); see also Craig Seidel, Content Fingerprinting from
an Industry Perspective, in 2009 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
MULTIMEDIA AND EXPO 1524, 1525 (2009) (discussing the technicalities of how
fingerprinting is used to identify copyrighted content).
63. How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).
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viewership statistics.64
The choices made by the online intermediaries on how online
content is filtered, removed, disabled, or blocked, lack any
transparency and legal oversight.65 There are numerous anecdotal
examples of erroneous removals and blocked access to noninfringing materials (false positive), but its overall scope remains
unknown.66 Access might be blocked based on copyright allegations
but also for reasons other than copyright enforcement, thus basically
performing robust censorship. For instance, a short clip from the
highly controversial movie, The Innocence of Muslims, which
sparked violent outbreaks across the Middle East, was blocked by
Google in several regions following informal requests made by
governments, and without any court order.67 In another example,
YouTube removed videos of India’s Daughter, a documentary film
based on the gang rape of a 23-year-old student.68 This film was
banned in India, presumably due to copyright infringement
allegations.69 YouTube also removed a series of important healthrelated videos that were created to debunk claims made in the movie
House of Numbers against current treatments for HIV/AIDS and its
argument that HIV positive people should stop taking life-saving
medications.70 Additionally, Fitnah, a satirical show on YouTube,
64. Id.
65. See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic
Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
66. See, e.g., David Zielenzinger, Google Blocking Access to ‘Innocence of
Muslims’ In Middle East, India, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2012, 11:23 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/google-blocking-access-%E2%80%98innocencemuslims%E2%80%99-middle-east-india-789258.
67. See id.
68. Unfortunately, however, YouTube removed most copies of the film soon
after they became available due to copyright infringement allegations made by the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), who allegedly made the original
broadcast from which the uploaded copies were taped. See YouTube Removes
India’s Daughter Videos after BBC Copyright Request, Trademarks & Brands
Online, TRADEMARKS & BRANDS ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.
trademarksandbrandsonline.com/news/youtube-removes-india-s-daughter-videosafter-bbc-copyright-request-4289.
69. See id.
70. See Timothy Geigner, AIDS Denial Crazies Go All DMCA on Videos
Educating People of their Craziness, TECHDIRT (Feb. 14, 2014, 1: 44 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140210/05172926163/aids-denial-crazies-goall-dmca-videos-educating-people-their-craziness.shtml.

ELKINREVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

16

10/24/16 3:45 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[32:1

was censored when Rotana, the primary, state-funded Saudi TV
channel, requested that DMCA remove several of their videos.71
These examples show that removal of non-infringing materials that
might be legitimately used without requiring a license, clearly
threatens access to knowledge.
Overall, access to content provided by online intermediaries and
the prevalence of algorithmic filtering, removal and blocking, is
effectively changing the copyright default. If copyrighted materials
were once available unless proven to be infringing, any materials
detected by the algorithm are now unavailable unless explicitly
authorized by the copyright owner.

III. FAIR USE ON THE GROUND: THE ISRAELI
CASE STUDY
Copyright law seeks to promote creation of new works for the
benefit of the public.72 Consequently, the law not only offers
incentives to authors but also seeks to foster access to creative works
for the purpose of further creation, learning, intellectual enrichment
and progress.73 Fair use is commonly viewed as facilitating a balance
within copyright law to serve this purpose.74
Can fair use effectively secure access to knowledge in our era?
71. Copyright Law as a Tool for State Censorship of the Internet, BEFORE IT’S
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2014, 11:22 AM), http://beforeitsnews.com/libertarian/2014/12/
copyright-law-as-a-tool-for-state-censorship-of-the-internet-2589350.html.
72. This is grounded in the constitutional purpose of copyright law, that is
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl.
8. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“[T]he economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare [by promoting the creation and dissemination of ideas] through the
talents of authors.”).
73. HathiTrust, supra note 8, at 94-95 (quoting Leval to highlight that
copyright law is acknowledged as “not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that
confers on authors the absolute ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to
stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the
public”); accord Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1107 (1990).
74. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (“From the
infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”)
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Fair use advocates believe that it can.75 They argue that the openended nature of fair use, offers flexibility that is particularly
important for adjusting copyright limitations and exceptions to the
dynamic requirements of rapidly developing technology.76 The ruling
in Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, for example, demonstrates that
authorizing the court to adjust limitations on copyright to dynamic
technological and economic circumstances, could facilitate new,
innovative uses of copyrighted works.77 Here the court held that
creating a new full-text searchable database of the books collection,
in order to serve new purposes that do not replace the original use of
the published books, constitutes fair use of the copyrighted works.78
Fair use will undoubtedly continue to play an important role in
encouraging the development of new and innovative uses. Fair use
matters, however, only when users are subject to copyright suit.
What is the role of fair use in the current copyright ecosystem? Does
fair use still matter for copyright enforcement? Does the shift in
copyright enforcement from courts to online intermediaries alter the
role of copyright? Does it marginalize the practical importance of
fair use for day-to-day copyright disputes?
This Part discusses empirical evidence derived from a study of
court cases in Israel, where defendant invoked the recently
introduced fair use claim. I begin by briefly introducing Israeli
copyright law and the legal reform that replaced the British fairdealing doctrine with the American model of fair use. Next, I present
75. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitations and
Exceptions, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 1, 33
(Ruth Okediji ed., 2016).
76. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 75, at 33; Ben Depoorter, Technology and
Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1834
(2009); Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of
Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 40405 (2005) (“In addition, a structural analysis of fair use indicates that the doctrine
is meant to be used as a flexible standard through which the judiciary can
determine the application of copyright in response to social and technological
changes - fair use was never intended to preserve the status quo in the face of
change.”); Gwen Hinze et al., The Fair Use Doctrine in the United States – A
Response to the Kernochan Report (July 26, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2298833.
77. See HathiTrust, supra note 8 (enabling this authorization “adds to the
original something new with a different purpose and a different character”).
78. See id.; see also Google, supra note 8, at 215.
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the findings of several studies that offer some empirical evidence on
the role of fair use in copyright enforcement. I compare reliance on
fair use in court disputes with its use in the context of enforcement
by online intermediaries. Part IV will discuss several policy
implications of these observations.

A. LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS UNDER ISRAELI LAW
1. From Fair Dealing to Fair Use
Israel introduced fair use in 2007 as part of a major copyright
reform, enacting the new 2007 Copyright Act).79 The 2007 Copyright
Act replaced the old British Copyright Act of 1911, which was in
force ever since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.80 The
statutory fair use provision replaced the much more limited British
fair dealing doctrine, which permits use only for purposes explicitly
listed by the law.81 Fair use, in contrast, defines an open-ended
standard that gives the courts broad discretion to decide which
unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work, might nevertheless be
considered permissible.
The process of incorporating the fair use doctrine into Israeli
79. See Copyright Law (2007), supra note 10. The Act was passed by the
Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) on November 19, 2007, and came into force on
May 25, 2008. See also id. § 77. Pursuant to the transitional provisions of the 2007
Law, the new copyright legislation shall apply to works made prior to the
commencement of the law, subject to certain exceptions. Acts which were
performed in relation to a work before the commencement of the 2007 Copyright
Law, are governed by the former law. Yet, an act which is not an infringement of
copyright or of moral rights under the 2007 Law, shall not be actionable according
to the provisions of the former copyright law. This means that the exemptions
listed by the new 2007 Copyright Law, including fair use, apply to acts which were
done in relation to a work before the commencement of the new law. See id. §
78(c). In other words, an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work prior to the new
law, which qualifies as fair use, will not be deemed infringing. See also TAMIR
AFORI, COPYRIGHT ACT 540 (2012) (Hebrew).
80. See Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46, § 37(2)(a) (Eng.); see also
Copyright Ordinance, CURRENT LAW 389. The Copyright Ordinance was amended
several times by the Israeli Parliament. See id. The transitional provisions of the
2007 Law provide that the Copyright Act of 1911, 3 Annotated Laws of Palestine
2475, and the Copyright Ordinance of 1924 continue to apply to certain matters.
See Copyright Law (2007), supra note 10, § 78.
81. Fair dealing under the 1911 Copyright Act, permitted the use of a
copyrighted work for a purpose strictly defined by law, as long as the scope of use
was fair
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copyright law began, however, years earlier in 1993 with the seminal
ruling of the Israeli Supreme Court in Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 82 In
Geva the Court addressed the use of the cartoon character Donald
Duck in a satirical work.83 To qualify as fair dealing under the
British clause, the permitted use must be classified under one of the
purposes enumerated by the law, e.g. criticism, research or selflearning.84 The Court has given a broad interpretation to the notion of
“criticism,” concluding that satire might also qualify as criticism, as
well as any act “placing a work in a new context that sheds
unexpected light upon it and reveals hidden layers.”85 However, not
every use for purposes of criticism would constitute fair dealing. A
second condition that must be satisfied in order to qualify as fair
dealing is fairness of use. As it lacked the criteria to evaluate fairness
in this case, the Court applied the four-factor analysis per section 107
of the US 1976 Copyright Act.86 Thus, the American fair use
doctrine was applied within the framework of the British fair dealing
provisions.87 Following Geva, this hybrid doctrine of fair dealing/fair
use evolved in the lower courts as judge-made laws, and was
eventually codified as fair use in the 2007 Copyright Act.88
2. Permitted Uses
Under the 2007 Copyright Act, any unauthorized use of a
copyrighted work that has been granted exclusive rights may
constitute an infringement,89 provided that the use is not permitted by
any of the exceptions and limitations listed in Chapter Four.90 The
82. See CA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Inc. 48(1) PD 251 (1993) (Isr.).
83. See id.
84. Copyright Act (1911), supra note 80, §2(1)(i).
85. See Geva, supra note 82.
86. General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat.
2541, 2546 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107).
87. Eventually, the Court denied fair dealing in that case, holding that it was a
commercial use that may cause economic harm to the plaintiff. See Geva, supra
note 82.
88. See Copyright Law (2007), supra note 10, § 19.
89. Id. § 47 (stating that the exclusive rights include reproduction, publication
of a work which was not yet published, public performance, broadcasting, making
the work available to the public, making a derivative work, and the rental of
physical copies to the public for a commercial purpose (if it is a computer
program, provided the program is not only ancillary to the primary rental object)).
90. Id. § 47. (“A person who does in relation to a work, any of the acts
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Israeli law further extends moral rights for authors to include the
right of attribution and the right of integrity.91 These rights are not
subject to the exception and limitations, including fair use.92
Chapter Four of the Copyright Act, entitled Permitted Uses,93
defines the circumstances under which exploitation or use of a
copyrighted work would be permissible by law even in the absence
of a license from the copyright owner.94 In addition to fair use, the
law lists multiple uses that are permitted without authorization of the
copyright owner, such as preparation of certain copies by public
libraries and archives;95 public performances in educational
institutions;96 transient and incidental copying of a work, provided
that this is an integral part of communication conducted by an
intermediary network;97 or making transient copies when necessary
specified in section 11, or who authorizes another person to perform any such act,
without the consent of the copyright owner, infringes the copyright, unless such act
is permitted pursuant to the provisions of Chapter IV.”).
91. See id. § 45(a) (highlighting that this moral right of attribution and
integrity applies to authors of artistic works, dramatic works, musical or literary
works, but not computer programs).
92. The right of integrity is subject, however, to a reasonableness test. § 50(b)
provides that any derogatory acts in relation to the work, that would otherwise may
violate the author’s moral right, “shall not constitute an infringement of the said
moral right where the act was reasonable in the circumstances of the case.” See id.
§ 47(b).
93. See Copyright Law (2007), supra note 10, § 18-32.
94. Id. § 18 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 11, the doing of the
actions specified in sections 19 to 30 is permitted subject to the conditions
specified respectively in the aforesaid sections and for the purpose of carrying out
the objectives specified therein, without the consent of the right holder or payment,
however with respect to the activities specified in section 32 – upon payment and
in accordance with the provisions of that section.”).
95. Id. § 30-31. These sections exempt certain uses in libraries and archives of
the type prescribed by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Education, for the
purpose of preservation.
96. Id. § 29 (explaining that the law permits public performance in an
educational institution, provided that it is made to an audience composed strictly of
students and employees of the educational institution, the students’ relatives or
others directly connected to the educational activity of the institution. A more
limited exemption applies to the public performance of films where performance is
permitted for teaching or examination purposes only); see also id. § 67(a)-(b)(2)
(stating that the minister responsible for prescribing such regulations for the
implementation of the law is the Minister of Justice subject to approval by the
Minister of Education).
97. Id. § 26.
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to enable lawful use of the work, provided that the said copy does not
have significant economic value in itself.98
Fair use was modeled after the U.S copyright law, with the explicit
intention of the legislator to allow Israeli courts to rely on US case
law for its interpretation. The fair use provision under the Israeli
Copyright Act is similar, but not identical, to the U.S. provision.
Section 19 provides that:
Fair use of a work is permitted for purposes such as: private study,
research, criticism, review, journalistic reporting, quotation, or instruction
and examination by an educational institution.
In determining whether a use made of a work is fair within the meaning of
this section, the factors to be considered shall include, inter alia, all of the
following:
The purpose and character of the use;
The character of the work used;
The scope of the use, quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the
work as a whole;
The impact of the use on the value of the work and its potential market. 99

Section 19(c) authorizes the Minister of Justice to “make
regulations prescribing conditions under which a use shall be deemed
a fair use.”100 The purpose of establishing this authority was to
reduce the uncertainty resulting from the open ended nature of the
98. Id.
The transient copying, including incidental copying, of a work, is permitted if such
is an integral part of a technological process whose only purpose is to enable
transmission of a work as between two parties, through a communications
network, by an intermediary entity, or to enable any other lawful use of the work,
provided the said copy does not have significant economic value in itself.
This exemption should be understood in the light of the broad definition of the
exclusive right to reproduce works in § 12. The statutory definition covers, among
other things, the storage of a copyrighted work by any technological means, and
the making of a temporary copy of a work.
99. Copyright Law (2007), supra note 10, § 19.
100. Id. § 19(c).
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fair use doctrine.101 So far, however, no regulation under this
provision has been issued.
Since the effective date of the law, Israeli courts developed the fair
use doctrine through adjudication. As is often the case with legal
transplants, fair use doctrine in Israeli law has developed a unique
meaning that may depart from its origin.102 For instance, courts
generally apply the four factors analysis when determining fairness
of use, yet some courts have also added an original requirement by
which appropriate credit (attribution) must be accorded to the
original author in order for the use to be considered fair.103
Israeli courts acknowledged the importance of access to
knowledge, by holding that maximizing access to copyrighted
materials by the general public serves the ultimate goal of copyright
law.104 Courts have also recognized the significance of
transformative use for fostering the goals of copyright law,105
although noting that this interest must be balanced against the
proprietary interests of the copyright owner.106
101. See Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
395, 395-96, 434, 437 (2009) (proposing an administrative tribunal that would
offer declarative judgment on fair use); see generally Michael W. Carroll, Fixing
Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007); see also Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory
Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 122, 151-52 (2004); Gideon Parchomovsky &
Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2007)
(proposing “safe harbors”).
102. See generally Michael Birnhack, Judicial Snapshots and Fair Use Theory,
5 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 264 (2015) (warning against under theorized legal
transplants).
103. See CA 2790/93 Eisenman v. Qimron 54(3) PD 817 ¶ 20 (2000) (Isr.)
(holding that a use could not considered fair when the user did not give appropriate
credit to the original author); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Users’ Rights, in
READINGS IN THE NEW COPYRIGHT ACT 327 (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach
eds., 2009) (Hebrew). For further discussion of the cases following the enactment
of the new law, where the court held that fair use is not available when the
defendant fails to provide credit to the copyright owner, see AFORI, supra note 79,
at 213.
104. CA 326/00 City of Holon v. N.M.C. Music Ltd., 57(3) PD 658 (2003)
(Isr); CA 9183/09 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd v. Anonymous (2012) (Isr.)
(describing fair use as reflecting an internal balance within copyright law, between
various goals of the law: incentivizing authors to create new works, and enriching
the public domain).
105. See Geva, supra note 82; CA 513/89 Interlego A/S v. Exin-Line Bros. S.A,
48(4) PD 133, 163 (1994) (Isr.).
106. CA 5977/07 Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Schocken Publ’g Ltd. 64(3) PD
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B. FAIR USE ON THE GROUND
The introduction of the fair use doctrine into Israeli copyright law
created high hopes for promoting access to knowledge. Did the
introduction of fair use reinforce user rights and secure more access?
Law on the books tells only a partial story. In order to assess the
significance of fair use, it is also necessary to explore how law is put
into practice. It is difficult to measure the impact of fair use on
Access to Knowledge for several reasons, including the difficulty to
define the group of potential fair users of copyrighted materials and
to identify potential uses that would not have taken place in the
absence of fair use.107 Yet, studying the impact of fair use on
copyright enforcement may offer some insights on the significance
of this doctrine.
Does fair use matter in copyright enforcement? An extensive study
of enforcement practices pertaining to online copyright
infringements in Israel offers empirical evidence on the impact of
fair use.108 The study compared two major enforcement strategies
following the enactment of the law: traditional court proceedings and
the Notice and Take Down (“N&TD”) procedure implemented by
online intermediaries.109 The study analyzed copyright lawsuits
pertaining to online infringements filed in Israeli courts during 20102013. These findings were compared to an extensive analysis of data
on notices filed under the N&TD procedure, as reported in the
Google Transparency Report, and a study of actual N&TD practices
of local intermediaries. The findings are discussed in detail below.
1. Fair Use in Courts
It might be too soon to fully assess the significance of introducing
fair use in Israeli law, as the law came into force less than a decade
ago. Some trends in litigation, however, can already be identified.
During the seven-year period that commenced on the date that the
740 (2011) (Isr.).
107. See generally R. van der Noll et al., Flexible Copyright The Law and
Economics of Introducing an Open Norm in the Netherlands 37-46 (2012),
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/760 [hereinafter Flexible Copyright];
JEREMY MALCOLM, supra note 17, at 141-206.
108. See Niva Elkin-Koren & Sharon Bar Ziv, Online Copyright Enforcement:
The Israeli Arena (University of Haifa, July 2015) (Hebrew).
109. See Id.
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Copyright Act came into force, there was a sharp increase in the
number of rulings by Israeli courts that addressed fair use.110 In only
seven years, between 2008-2015, Israeli courts issued approximately
48 rulings that address fair use.111 In comparison, during the period
of sixty years between 1948 and 2008, commencing on the date of
the establishment of the State of Israel and ending on the date that
the Copyright Act came into force, fair dealing was addressed by
roughly 30 rulings.112
Published rulings only partially present the role of fair use in
copyright litigation. The reason is that many lawsuits do not end in a
ruling. An empirical analysis of lawsuits and briefs may offer a
broader view of the legal proceedings, interim decisions, and
lawsuits that were concluded by Alternative Dispute Resolutions.113
The current study therefore analyzed all of the lawsuits filed in Israel
for online copyright in the years 2010- 2013.114 The findings show
that fair use was claimed by defendants in only 11% of the cases.115
In the vast majority of cases, the claim of fair use was not even
raised.
This small number of fair use claims is somewhat surprising.
Indeed, lawsuits are self-selected by plaintiffs; therefore, it could be
reasonably assumed that plaintiffs would avoid filing a lawsuit that
explicitly raises fair use. Yet, defendants who do not believe that
their claims are set in stable ground may avoid litigation altogether
110. Elkin-Koren & Bar Ziv, supra note 108.
111. Id.
112. A caveat: this data should be understood in light of the general increase in
litigation and the increase in copyright litigation in particular.
113. See generally Matthew Sag, Empirical Studies of Copyright Litigation:
Nature of Suit Coding 1-7 (Loyola Univ. Chi. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Research Paper No. 2013-017, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330256; see also id. at 2 (citing George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984)); Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for
Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse,
75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 168 (2006).
114. The relevant cases were identified using the electronic case management
system of the Israeli Courts System (“NetLaw”) and appropriate legal databases.
The analysis included the identity of the litigants (distinguishing between
individuals, corporate and public players), the types of works which were the
subject of the lawsuit, the types of remedies sought by litigants and granted in
practice, and the different types of rulings that were handed by the court.
115. See generally Elkin-Koren & Bar Ziv, supra note 108.
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and opt for a settlement. Choosing to face litigation may therefore
signal a certain basis for denying the suit. Consequently, the finding
that defendants who chose to litigate rather than settle will refrain
from raising fair use claims is surprising. Indeed, defendants’ claims
are not limited to fair use. The defendant could raise an entire range
of issues, including denying the plaintiff’s copyright or refuting the
claim that their action constitutes an infringement under the law. Yet,
in view of the broad discretion afforded to the court in fair use cases,
it was predicted that more defendants would raise this legal claim.116
These findings suggest that fair use had a relatively small impact
on copyright enforcement. There is one important caveat to these
findings. One should keep in mind that the study analyzed lawsuits
that were filed in court. Legal actions, however, also take place
outside of court via negotiations, settlements, and cease-and-desist
letters sent by potential claimants who believe that their copyright
has been infringed. At times, this activity is more extensive than
litigation in the courtroom. Legal actions outside of the court may
also influence litigation and the outcome of the legal proceedings.
Settlements are reached in the shadow of the law and are shaped,
among other factors, by the prospects of winning in court.117
Consequently, the importance of fair use should be measured outside
of the courtroom as well. One example that demonstrates the
mobilizing significance of fair use is the struggle to secure access to
educational materials in Israel. The introduction of fair use inspired
the establishment of a coalition of Israeli academic institutions that
proactively developed a Code of Fair Use Best Practices, which
governs fair use for educational purposes.118 These principles were
eventually adopted in a settlement agreement between Hebrew
116. Id.
117. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F.
L. REV. 411, 411 (2015) (arguing that in the US only a small proportion of legal
disputes ends up in court). One reason for the large discrepancy between the
number of legal disputes and the extent of court litigation in the field of copyright
is the widespread use of legal threat and of removal requests. There are several
reasons why potential claimants prefer to use threatening letters requesting
removal rather than going to court: the cost of litigation, uncertainty regarding the
results of litigation, and success in previous cases using removal request letters.
118. See generally Amira Dotan et al., Fair Use Best Practices for Higher
Education Institutions: The Israeli Experience, J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
(forthcoming).
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University and two major academic publishers, which was approved
by the court.119
Israeli adjudication on user rights suggests that simply introducing
fair use into the statute is not the culmination of copyright reform.
Instead, it is only the beginning of an ongoing struggle to safeguard
unlicensed use that is deemed necessary to the very creativity which
copyright law is designed to foster.
2. Fair use in copyright enforcement by online intermediaries
As discussed above, a large portion of online copyright
enforcement nowadays is performed via online intermediaries.
Online intermediaries are generally not held liable for infringing
materials posted by their subscribers unless they knowingly
contributed to the copyright infringement.120 Moreover, the safe
harbor regime established by the US DMCA grants immunity to
online intermediaries from monetary liability, provided that they
comply with the DMCA safe harbor provisions.121 To qualify for safe
harbor, a hosting facility must meet several requirements, including
applying the Notice and Take Down (N&TD) procedures.122 The
119. For
an
English
translation
of
the
settlement,
see
http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/en/AcademyInCommunity/ClinicList/tech/Documents/Co
de%20of%20Best%20Practices%20[English%20Translation].pdf
see also Ariel Katz, Israeli Publishers and Hebrew University Reach Historic
Agreement on Fair Use, ARIEL KATZ ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION,
INNOVATION, & OTHER ISSUES (Nov. 28, 2013), http://arielkatz.org/archives/3042;
Kevin Smith, Fair Use, Georgia State, and the Rest of the World, DUKE UNIV.
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2013/12/02/fair-usegeorgia-state-and-the-rest-of-the-world; CrivBlog, GSU Updates and a Way
Forward, CRIVBLOG (Dec. 3, 2013), https://crivblog.com/2013/12/03/gsu-updatesand-a-way-forward-from-israel.
120. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2016);
Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright
Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J.
375, 376 (2009).
121. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (stating that to qualify for immunity under the
N&TD regime, an OSP cannot have actual knowledge that infringing content is on
its system or be “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent”); see also id. § 512(c)(1)(B) (providing that if OSPs later become aware
of such content, they must expeditiously remove it from their system; moreover, it
should not receive a direct financial benefit from any infringing activity, which it
has the right and ability to control).
122. See id. § 512(a)-(d), (i) (immunity from monetary liability for materials
that are transmitted over networks, cached on a server, linked to, or stored at the
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N&TD procedure established by the DMCA requires online
intermediaries to respond “expeditiously” to notices of infringement
by removing or disabling access to allegedly infringing material
when certain conditions are met.123 The DMCA further encourages
compliance with N&TD by exempting OSPs from liability for
mistaken, yet good faith removal of material.124
It is important to note that currently, online intermediaries are
encouraged to remove materials expeditiously upon receiving a
notice, without exercising any discretion regarding the substantive
claims.125 As further explained below, until recently right-holders
were also exempted from considering fair use prior to issuing a
removal request.
Israeli law, like many jurisdictions outside the United States, has
no clear statutory framework that governs the N&TD procedure.
Israeli courts have applied the doctrine of contributory infringement
in the case of online intermediaries, holding that intermediaries will
be held liable for infringing materials posted by their users if they
knowingly contributed to the infringement.126 Therefore, similar to
U.S. law, online intermediaries might be subject to contributory
liability for copyright infringing materials posted by their
subscribers, if they fail to remove the materials upon receiving a
notice.

direction of a user, OSPs are required to adopt and implement certain policies. In
particular, OSPs must comply with two preliminary policies. First, they must adopt
and reasonably implement a policy to terminate the accounts of repeat infringers
and must notify users of this plan. Second, they must also accommodate “standard
technical measures” used by copyright owners to identify infringing material).
123. See id. §§ 512(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii), 512(c)(1)(C).
124. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120 § 512(g)(1) (stating that
intermediaries that fail to act in good faith may lose safe harbor and may be
required to pay damages to content providers whose material was unlawfully
removed under the intermediaries’ stated terms of use).
125. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling
Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 626 (2006).
126. See, e.g., Schocken, supra note 106; CC (CT) 567-08-09 ALIS, Ass’n for
the Protection of Cinematic Works v. Rotter.net Ltd. (Aug. 8, 2011). Note that
liability for contributory copyright infringement under Israeli case law requires
actual knowledge of the infringing acts. Constructive knowledge would be
insufficient for establishing liability.
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The Google search engine has become a focal point for enforcing
copyright. Google is the main platform for locating sites and gaining
access to materials posted on the internet. Content that is inaccessible
via Google is difficult to find. Consequently, when Google removes
links to allegedly infringing materials or even simply relegate links
to the bottom of the search results, 127 the allegedly infringing content
might still be available online on the original website, but this may
significantly reduce traffic to the site.
The study reported above, further sought to record the scope of
online copyright enforcement targeting Israeli websites, by analyzing
data released by Google. Google, which is a U.S.-based OSP, is
following the DMCA, and applying the N&TD to notices targeting
Israeli websites. Google regularly receives requests (notices) from
apparent copyright owners to remove links to allegedly infringing
materials from the search results returned by the engine. Notices are
conveyed to Google through an online form.128 Each request lists the
name of the sender, the name of the copyright owner, and one or
more webpages (URLs) that Google is asked to remove from the
search results. After receiving the removal request, Google often
removes the link, to comply with the DMCA.129 To increase
transparency with regard to this activity, Google publishes periodic
transparency reports (Google Transparency Report, GTR).130
The analysis of Google GTR yielded a high volume of notices that
is consistently increasing. Based on the analysis of data reported by
127. Google’s Pirate algorithm, revised in 2014, changes its search algorithm in
such a way that sites for which a large number of removal requests have been
received are assigned a low ranking in search results, relegating them to the bottom
of the search results, where it is difficult to locate them. See Continued Progress
on Fighting Piracy, GOOGLE PUB. POLICY BLOG (Oct. 17, 2014),
https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/2014/10/continued-progress-on-fightingpiracy.html.
128. Removing Content from Google, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/
legal/troubleshooter/1114905?rd=1#ts=1115655 (last visited Jul. 22, 2016).
129. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120, § 512(d).
130. The GTR contains data related to the removal requests it received,
including information on the entities that sent the requests, the allegedly infringing
content, and the manner in which the requests were addressed and the materials in
question handled. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/. The data published
by Google relate both to the handling of the specific removal requests and to the
“suspected domain names.” See Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://www.
google.com/transparencyreport/ (last visited Jul. 22, 2016).
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the GTR, the study found that during the period between July 2011
and December 2013,131 a total of 7091 removal requests concerning
Israeli URLs (i.e. with an “.il” extension) were submitted to
Google.132

Figure 1: Distribution of requests filed with Google for removal of Israeli
webpages from search results, July 2011-December 2013

By comparison, during the years 2010-2013 a total number of 687
copyright infringement lawsuits were filed.133 The majority of
lawsuits involving copyright infringement during that time
concerned infringements outside the internet (60%), while only 40%
of the lawsuits addressed online infringements.134

131. See infra Figure 1: Distribution of Requests Filed with Google for
Removal of Israeli Webpages from Search Results, July 2011-December 2013
(showing the distribution of requests submitted between July 2011 and December
2013. To avoid an edge effect, we do not present data before July 2011 and after
December 2013, which is the reason for the gap between the 6926 requests shown
in the graph and the 7091 requests submitted according to the Google reports).
132. Elkin-Koren & Bar Ziv, supra note 108.
133. Id.
134. Only 32% of the lawsuits (216 cases) exclusively addressed online
infringements, and the remaining 8% involved both online and offline
infringements.
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Figure 2: The Number of Internet Copyright Cases per Year, 2010-2013

These findings demonstrate the prevalence of copyright
enforcement by online intermediaries. Its scale is unparalleled to
copyright enforcement in court. In other words, the vast majority of
disputes related to allegedly copyright infringing materials rely on
N&TD procedures, and, currently, these procedures do not involve
any fair use claims.135
As explained, fair use plays a relatively minor role in the
enforcement procedures of online intermediaries. An experiment,
which was part of the same study, took a closer look at the actual
practices of local online intermediaries and confirmed this
conclusion.136 The study sought to systematically test how hosting
websites implement the N&TD policy.137 In order to do so, different
types of infringing and non-infringing materials, including content
that clearly qualifies as fair use, were uploaded to designated hosting
facilities.138 After uploading the content, a takedown notice was sent
135. Elkin-Koren & Bar Ziv, supra note 108.
136. Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 66.
137. These platforms were designated by various Israeli forums as being the
most popular file sharing platforms in Israel, a designation that was also confirmed
by the second biggest advertising company in Israel. Id.
138. The researchers have attempted to upload three types of images to the
image-sharing platforms: (1) an infringing image of a known work with a
copyright notice ©; (2) a non-infringing image; (3) a non-infringing image with a
copyright notice ©. The researchers have also attempted to uploaded different
types of videos snippets to the video-sharing platforms: (a) a 2:42 minutes
infringing video with Content ID (a snippet of an original, copyright-protected
video, can trigger an automatic content filtering technology, such as YouTube’s
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to the platform claiming that the content infringes copyrights and
requesting its removal.139 During all stages, the response time and
follow-up actions of the various platforms were systematically
recorded. 140
The findings show that local hosting facilities in Israel behaved
inconsistently and thus were unpredictable in how they detected
online infringements and enforced copyrights. Specifically, 25% of
video-sharing platforms and approximately 10% of image-sharing
platforms seemed to employ a system of ex ante filtering of
presumed infringing online content, indicating that online
intermediaries occasionally go beyond N&TD and remove content
automatically before receiving complaints of copyright
infringement.141 Furthermore, 50% of video-sharing platforms and
12.5% of image-sharing platforms removed infringing content after
Content ID); (b) a similar snippet of the same video, but without Content ID (a
snippet of an already-copied video may not be identified by an automatic content
filtering technology such as YouTube’s Content ID; (c) a non-infringing short
video; (d) a Fair Use homemade video clip; (e) a 19 seconds non-infringing video
with a copyright notice ©, and (f) a 3:22 minutes video of non-infringing photos
with a copyright notice © and with an infringing music. Id.
139. The study proceeded in several steps, each of which was systematically
recorded by the researchers: First, different types of content were submitted to the
examined platforms. When upload was unsuccessful, the researchers assumed that
an ex ante mechanism of filtering was used. Second, when upload was successful,
the researchers checked periodically whether the content remained online or was
otherwise blocked/removed. Third, if the content remained online after 72 hours,
the researchers sent a notice to the platform complaining it was probably hosting
copyright infringing content. Fourth, if the content was removed by the platform
after receiving the notice, the researchers reported whether they received a notice
of removal. In the case that they were notified about the removal, the researchers
reported whether that notification contained information about the removal reason;
whether it contained information about the complainant and whether it provided
any dispute opportunities. Fifth, the researchers examined periodically whether the
removed content remained offline. Sixth, after two weeks, the researchers
attempted to reload the removed content and reported whether reload was
successful, partly successful or unsuccessful. Id.
140. The study sought to determine whether they filter infringing content ex
ante by automatically blocking presumably infringing uploads, or whether they
only remove such posts ex post, upon notice of copyright infringement; whether
they verify the rights claimed by the complainants; whether they notify alleged
infringers and complainants about content removals; whether the content becomes
accessible following the removal and whether they learn from past incidents and
automatically block second time attempts to reload infringing content. Id.
141. Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 66.
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receiving a complaint notice, while one-third of the image-sharing
platforms also removed non-infringing content after receiving a
complaint notice.142 In other words, some platforms allow content
that is filtered by others; some platforms rigidly respond to any
notice requesting removal of content despite it being clearly noninfringing; while other platforms fail to remove content upon
receiving notification of alleged infringement.
Overall, the study revealed that copyright enforcement by online
intermediaries in Israel is robust in terms of scale and volume. These
findings are consistent with global trends. Copyright owners prefer to
vindicate their rights by resorting to online resolution systems,
instead of going through the hustle of filing an expensive and timeconsuming suit for copyright infringement. Copyright enforcement
thus becomes algorithmic: right holders are using robots to search the
web for infringing activity, and submit voluminous amounts of
automatic removal requests simultaneously to all platforms identified
as containing allegedly infringing material.143
These findings also raise concerns regarding Access to
Knowledge. The first concern is that while fair use can be invoked in
a copyright infringement lawsuit, there is little room for fair use
under the current enforcement procedures implemented by online
intermediaries. Second, the findings show that online intermediaries
remove non-infringing materials, including materials that clearly
qualify as fair use.144 These findings are consistent with anecdotes
reported elsewhere on the removal of fair use materials.145
Third, it is apparent that fair use is not incorporated into the
current Israeli N&TD practices in any way. On the contrary, in the
absence of any procedure similar to the DMCA, Israeli
142. Id.
143. See Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and
Takedown in Everyday Practice (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No.
2755628, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628
144. A fair use home-made video, in which a toddler is singing 48 seconds of a
copyrighted song, was removed upon a notice in 1/4 of hosting sites to which it
was uploaded. Id.
145. See Dineen Wasylik, Take Down Abuse: From Harry Potter to Legos,
DPW LEGAL (Feb. 7, 2014), http://ip-appeals.com/take-down-abuse-from-harrypotter-to-legos (recounting how a ten-year-old boy’s self-authored original video
starring his LEGO mini-figures and garbage truck was blocked despite the fact that
he used royalty-free music).
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intermediaries have a strong incentive to remove any material
expeditiously upon receiving a notice. Otherwise, they might be
exposed to contributory liability for hosting infringing materials.
Also, under the DMCA online intermediaries have strong
incentives to take down or block access to allegedly infringing
content to avoid the risk of facing liability for their users’
infringements.146 Indeed, the N&TD procedure established by the
DMCA requires OSPs to take “reasonable steps promptly to notify
the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the
material”147 and promptly forward any counter notices from alleged
infringers back to the original complainant.148 If after ten to fourteen
days following receipt of a counter notice, the complainant does not
notify the OSP that she had filed a lawsuit, the OSP must reinstate
the contested material.149 Yet the DMCA’s counter notice procedure
places the burden of responding to notices on alleged infringers.
Recipients of removal notices may often lack important information
about the allegations and the legal expertise necessary to address
them. Given the volume of notices in the robust sphere of online
copyright enforcement, a counter notice is often impractical. The
handful of cases addressing the counter notice procedure suggest that
this procedure is long, the burden of proof is high, and it does not
effectively deter right-holders from issuing mass notifications.150
All in all, the findings of the study suggest that the presence of fair
146. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120, § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii)
(2016); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: the First Amendment,
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
11, 23 (2006) (discussing the dangers of using proxy censors on free speech); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright after Golan v.
Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1120-27 (2013).
147. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120, § 512(g)(2)(A)
(2016).
148. See id. § 512(g)(2)(B) (2016). A counter-notification must include the
following: (A) a physical or electronic signature; (B) identification of the material
removed and its former location; (C) statement under penalty of perjury that the
user has a good faith belief the material was mistakenly removed; (D) the user’s
name, address, and phone number; and (E) consent to the jurisdiction of Federal
District Court. See also 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) (2016).
149. Search engines, on the other hand, are not required to notify the alleged
infringer of removal because they are not expected to have any service relationship
with the alleged infringer. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120,
§ 512(d) (2016); Urban, supra note 143.
150. Urban, supra note 143.
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use in the actual practice of copyright enforcement is minimal. For
fair use to remain significant in the new digital frontiers, it must be
incorporated into the N&TD procedures. This will be further
discussed in part IV below.

IV. FAIR USE - NEW FRONTIERS
Does fair use matter for access to knowledge? Fair use leaves the
courts broad discretion, allowing them to develop a space for
unlicensed use and adjust the law to new needs and circumstances.
Therefore, fair use will undoubtedly continue to play an important
role in encouraging the development of new and innovative uses.
Fair use matters, however, only when copyright claims are invoked.
Where barriers to access are not tied to copyright, fair use may
become secondary. The shift in copyright enforcement from courts to
online intermediaries alter the role of copyright, and may marginalize
the practical importance of fair use for day-to-day copyright disputes.
Can fair use secure some space for non-infringing use of copyrighted
materials in this environment?
The Israeli case study demonstrates that online intermediaries have
become the primary enforcers of copyright law.151 This enforcement
arena differs from copyright enforcement in court in many
respects,152 two of which might be particularly relevant to fair use.
The first is that enforcement takes place in private facilities, and the
second is its algorithmic implementation. The fact that online
intermediaries are private facilities raises a whole new set of issues
related to the increasingly obscured boundaries between the public
and private domains. For instance, when intermediaries choose to
filter allegedly infringing materials or to remove some materials
upon notice, they may simply be making private choices regarding
content that is made available on their platforms.153 At the same time
however, when online intermediaries monitor, filter, block and
remove allegedly infringing materials they engage, de facto, in
copyright enforcement.154 Are online intermediaries free to decide
151.
152.
153.
(2014).
154.

See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
Elkin-Koren & Bar Ziv, supra note 108.
James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 870-71
Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 66.
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which content to carry? Are they subject to any duties in exercising
discretion on which content to remove? Another set of issues relates
to cost and the reasonable scope of law enforcement duties that
might be imposed on private entities.155
A second characteristic of copyright enforcement by online
intermediaries is that it is algorithmic. Over the past two decades, the
N&TD regime has become ubiquitous and embedded in the system
design of all major intermediaries. Major copyright owners
increasingly use robots to identify unauthorized use of their work
online and send large numbers of takedown requests. In response,
major online intermediaries use algorithms to filter, block, and
disable access to allegedly infringing content automatically, with
little or no human intervention.156 The N&TD procedure mandates
immediate removal and pushes fair use aside.
Copyright enforcement by online intermediaries introduces new
frontiers. If fair use is narrowly interpreted as merely a legal defense
(“the legal defense approach”), its impact on Access to Knowledge is
likely to decline in the new copyright frontiers. Indeed, fair use may
still offer a powerful legal doctrine – enabling the court to adjust the
law to accommodate new technological changes. Yet, in the
emerging environment that is regulated by online intermediaries,
governed by licenses, terms of use and algorithms, copyright is
neither the problem nor the solution.
Fair use as an affirmative defense merely offers an excuse for
circumstances in which an otherwise infringing copying will impose
copyright liability. But fair use as a legal defense might be largely
irrelevant to online enforcement, and consequently the legal defense
approach to fair use might be insufficient for counterbalancing these
developments. In a N&TD regime, online intermediaries are required
to comply with the notice expeditiously and exercise no discretion
regarding the allegedly infringing materials. In voluntary blocking,
filtering and removal by online intermediaries (DMCA Plus), there
might not be a copyright claim to confront at all, and there is often
155. See Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film
Verleih GmbH ( March 27, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=149924&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first
&part=1&cid=572548 (showing that cost was one of the issues addressed by a
recent decision of the CJEU on site-blocking order).
156. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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no procedure for raising fair use claims. Therefore, these new
frontiers call for a different approach to addressing the freedom of
access that is protected under fair use.
The following discussion proposes an approach that could help
revive fair use in this context. First, at the conceptual level, fair use
should be interpreted as a user’s right and not simply an affirmative
defense. Second, fair use must be incorporated into online
enforcement processes, either by clarifying legal procedures or by
embedding fair use considerations in the design. The following
discussion briefly introduces the user rights approach to fair use and
demonstrates how it could become useful for ensuring access to
copyright materials in an environment of robotic notices and
algorithmic enforcement. The recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp157 is discussed in order to demonstrate
how the user rights approach could be incorporated in the N&TD
procedure and offer fair use by design.

A. THE USER RIGHTS APPROACH
The user rights approach to fair use presumes that incentives to
authors are only one means of promoting creativity, while other,
equally important mechanisms focus on securing adequate access
rights for users. In other words, the rights of authors (for incentives
or just reward) and the rights of users to use creative works (e.g.,
read, learn, disseminate, re-use, and transform) are different
mechanisms for promoting copyright goals.158 From this perspective,
the fair use doctrine significantly limits the scope of the monopoly
granted to authors under copyright law. It is designed to identify the
circumstances in which unlicensed use should be permissible in
order to promote the goals that copyright law seeks to achieve. The
right to perform these uses without a license is derived from
copyright intended goals, and therefore fair use is not simply a noninfringing use, but rather it is mandated by copyright policy.
The Supreme Court of Israel addressed the issue of user rights
under the new copyright act, in several cases pertaining to the legal
157. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016).
158. Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem: A User-Rights
Approach, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (Ruth
Okediji ed., 2015).
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status of permissible uses. 159 Initially, in 2012, the Court explicitly
rejected the position that fair use is a user right. The case Football
Association Premier League Ltd v Anonymous (2012)160 involved a
petition to unmask the identity of an anonymous user who streamed
unauthorized broadcasts of football matches owned by the English
Premier League. Although the petition was dismissed on procedural
grounds, the Israeli Supreme Court held that streaming constituted
copyright infringement and that fair use did not apply.161 The Court
further clearly stated the legal defense approach to fair use. The
Court described fair use as facilitating copyright internal balance,
between incentivizing authors and enriching the public domain, yet,
it explicitly rejected the position that fair use was a right. The Court
explained that fair use, as an affirmative defence, could still serve
that purpose. Moreover, the Court reasoned that even though the new
law explicitly defined fair use as “permitted use,” it did not accord
fair use the legal status of a ‘right’ which is equivalent to
copyright.162
Soon afterwards, the Supreme Court questioned this approach in
Telran Ltd. v Charlton Communications (2013).163 The case involved
the legality of marketing decoding cards that enabled Israeli
customers to decode the encoded broadcasts of the World Cup
games, which were transmitted from foreign channels via satellite.
The Court held that merely distributing the decoding cards did not
amount to a copyright infringement, nor was it a contributory
infringement, since simply watching copyrighted materials did not
constitute a copyright infringement.164 The Court explicitly rejected
the defense approach to fair use held by the Premier League Court,
noting that fair use is not merely a technical defense for copyright
infringement but a permissible use.165 Consequently, even if users of
159. See id., at 327 (arguing that the new Israeli copyright act offered a new
legal framework for conceptualizing users’ rights).
160. CC (TA) 1636/08 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous
(Sept. 2, 2009) (Isr.), http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/mechozi/me-08-163611.doc.
161. Id. at 2.
162. Id. at 9-10.
163. CA 5097/11 Telran Commc’n (1986) Ltd. vs. Charlton Ltd., 45 Int’l Rev.
Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 233 (Isr. Sept. 2, 2013).
164. Id. at 233.
165. See Israeli Supreme Court: circumvention of copyright protection is not
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these decoding cards were making unauthorized copies which were
nevertheless considered fair use, there were no grounds for holding
the defendant liable for contributory infringement. According to
Justice Zilbertal, users who exercise user rights do not commit an
excusable infringing act, but instead act in a manner that is explicitly
permissible by law and therefore there is no infringement to begin
with. Consequently, “when no infringement materializes, there is no
infringement to “contribute” to.166 Hence, since the end-users carried
out a permissible act, the middleman “contributed” to a permissible
act – and in any event did not infringe any rights of the copyright
owner, since these rights were not violated in the first place.”167
Subsequently, in the case of Safecom v Raviv (2013),168 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed this approach. The decision addressed
copying drawings of a functional electric device in a patent
application submitted to the USPTO. The Court adopted and cited
the user rights approach upheld in Telran and noted the judicial
controversy on this issue, commenting that the time was ripe for an
extended judicial panel to consider this matter.169
Canada was a pioneer in promoting user rights.170 User rights were
first explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004,
in the landmark case of CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper
Canada.171 This approach was recently reaffirmed in a series of
copyright decisions.172
prohibited, LAW.CO.IL (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.law.co.il/en/m/#/news/7601/.
166. Telran Commc’n, supra note 163, at 237.
167. Id.
168. CA 7996/11 Safecom Ltd. v. Raviv (Isr. Nov. 18, 2013),
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Safecom%2C%20Lt
d.%20v.%20Raviv.pdf.
169. Id. at ¶ 35.
170. See Teresa Scassa, Recalibrating Copyright Law?: A Comment on the
Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in CCH Canadian Limited et al. v. Law
Society of Upper Canada, 3 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 89 (2004) (discussing how
Théberge v. Galerie D’Art du Petit Champlain, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, and CCH
Canadian, infra note 171, illustrated an area of law where Parliament has been
strongly lobbied to restrict users’ rights).
171. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.). See generally Abraham Drassinower, Taking
User Rights Seriously, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN
COPYRIGHT LAW 462 (Michael Geist ed. 2005).
172. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) v.
Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326; Canadian Copyright Licensing
Agency, supra note 33.
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These recent developments in Canada and Israel suggest that the
legal status of fair use might have far-reaching consequences.
Canadian copyright law includes fair dealing provisions, which are
far more limited than fair use. Under fair dealing the use not only has
to be proven fair, but must also fall under one of the strictly defined
purposes enumerated by law. The Supreme Court of Canada held
that since fair dealing was a user right “it must not be interpreted
restrictively.”173 Accordingly, the Court broadly interpreted research,
under fair dealing, as also including sampling conducted during
consumer research, and private study as also including copying by
teachers.
The user rights approach to fair use could also help to set limits on
the rights and duties of copyright owners who issue removal notices,
and on copyright enforcement performed by online intermediaries.
Following this approach, a copyright owner cannot limit fair use
(right) by a unilateral license. A user rights approach to fair use may
also affect the corresponding duties of online intermediaries, offering
a legal framework for invalidating terms of use that unfairly restrict
fair use and fundamental freedoms. For instance, as further
demonstrated in the next section, right holders might be required to
consider fair use before issuing a notice. Moreover, online
intermediaries might be required to consider fair use in designing
DMCA Plus procedures such as filtering. Overall, a user rights
approach to fair use may offer more robust safeguarding of users’
liberties in the digital ecosystem.

B. LENZ V. UNIVERSAL, AND BEYOND
The recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in Lenz v. Universal
Studios174 demonstrates some of these issues. In this case, the court
addressed the question of whether fair use should be considered by
the copyright holder prior to sending a takedown notice. Stephanie
Lenz uploaded a 29-second home video to YouTube in which her
two toddlers are seen dancing in the family kitchen to the song “Let’s
Go Crazy” by Prince. Universal, who represented Prince’s copyright,
173. See CCH Canadian, supra note 171, at 364 (describing that the rights
should be given the “fair and balanced reading that befits remedial legislation”).
174. See Lenz, supra note 157, at 1133 (holding that a copyright holder “must
consider the existence of fair use before sending a takedown notification under
Section 512(c)).
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requested the removal of this video in a takedown notice sent to
YouTube.175 After receiving the takedown request, YouTube
removed the video and notified Lenz of its removal. After sending
two counter-notifications, YouTube eventually reinstated the
video.176 Lenz filed a suit claiming that Universal was liable for
misrepresentation under § 512(f) of the DMCA.177 The question
addressed was whether the law requires a copyright holder to
consider whether the potentially infringing materials constitute fair
use before issuing a notice. The DMCA requires that notifications
include a statement that the complaining party “has a good faith
belief” that the use of the materials “is not authorized by the
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”178
Fair use, the court held, “is not just excused by law, it is wholly
authorized by law.”179 According to the language of the statute, the
court explained that “fair use of a copyrighted work is permissible
because it is non-infringing use.”180 The court denied Universal’s
argument that fair use is an affirmative dense that excuses otherwise
infringing conduct. Fair use, the court held, should be viewed as a
right, and therefore it is “authorized by law.”181 Consequently,
issuing a takedown notice without forming a good faith belief that
the allegedly infringing work was not authorized by law (i.e., did not
constitute fair use) may amount to misrepresentation.182
Accordingly, the ruling in the Lenz case requires right-holders to
175. Id. at 1130.
176. Id.
177. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120, § 512(f) (2016)
(providing “Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this
section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity
was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any
damages . . . .”).
178. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) requires a takedown notification to include a
“statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that the use of the
material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its
agent, or the law.”
179. See Lenz, supra note 157, at 1132.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. The court examined whether “Universal knowingly misrepresented that it
had formed a good faith belief the video did not constitute fair use.” That is not to
say that Universal should have known that the video was fair use. It only had to
form a subjective good faith belief that a use is not authorized (i.e., it is not fair
use). Id. at 1134.
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consider fair use prior to sending takedown notification. If the rightholders fail to consider fair use, they might face liability. If,
however, they consider fair use but mistakenly believe in good faith
that the allegedly infringing materials does not constitute fair use,
they will not be held liable.183
The court notes that “good faith belief” is subjective, yet, it offers
several guidelines on what is required in order to comply with the
statutory standard (i.e., forming a good faith belief that a use is not
fair). Accordingly, the rights-holder should not overlook evidence to
the contrary, yet the consideration of fair use need not be “searching
or intensive.” 184 The court was well aware of the burden involved in
exercising discretion of this sort:
We are mindful of the pressing crush of voluminous infringing content
that copyright holders face in a digital age. But that does not excuse a
failure to comply with the procedures outlined by Congress.185

Therefore, the court implied that consideration of fair use prior to
issuing a takedown notice may not necessarily require a human
review186 and might be implemented by an algorithm.187 Human
review could be employed for the “minimal remaining content a
computer program does not cull.”188 Yet, the court refrained from
explicitly ruling on this issue. This language was eventually removed
from the revised opinion. Algorithmic implementation of “good
faith” considerations regarding the existence of fair use may raise a
183. At the same time, however, the court emphasizes that, “A copyright holder
who pays lip service to the consideration of fair use by claiming it formed a good
faith belief when there is evidence to the contrary is still subject to § 512(f)
liability.” Id. at 1135.
184. Id.
185. Lenz, supra note 157, at 1135.
186. Id. (“We note, without passing judgment, that the implementation of
computer algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith middle ground for
processing a plethora of content while still meeting the DMCA’s requirements to
somehow consider fair use.”).
187. Id. (“For example, consideration of fair use may be sufficient if copyright
holders utilize computer programs that automatically identify for takedown
notifications content where: “(1) the video track matches the video track of a
copyrighted work submitted by a content owner; (2) the audio track matches the
audio track of that same copyrighted work; and (3) nearly the entirety . . . is
comprised of a single copyrighted work.”).
188. Id. at 1136.
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whole new set of questions regarding liability for discretion
exercised by such systems. For instance, who would be held
accountable for errors, and what rate of false positives and false
negatives would be acceptable?189

V. CONCLUSION
One of the greatest challenges to access to knowledge in the 21st
century is private ordering. Terms of use, restrictions by design and
robust algorithmic enforcement threaten to wipe out many of the
safeguards of access created by fair use.
The user rights approach to fair use could help set limits on
private ordering. According to this approach, limits on fair use fall
beyond the bundle of rights defined by copyright, and therefore
cannot be unilaterally restricted by a license. A user rights approach
to fair use may also affect the corresponding duties of content
providers and online intermediaries, offering a legal framework for
invalidating terms of use that unfairly restrict fair use and
fundamental freedoms.
At the procedural level, since the targets of the complaint do not
have the option of defending themselves prior to removal of their
content, fair use is not contested at the initial stages of algorithmic
enforcement. Therefore, to revive and strengthen fair use in this
arena, it is necessary to ensure that fair use considerations are applied
prior to filing a notice. Fair use analysis might also be incorporated
into the filtering, blocking and removal design, of online
intermediaries, basically introducing “fair use by design.”
Overall, adapting a user rights approach to fair use and
incorporating fair use in the enforcing design of online intermarries
may offer more robust safeguards for users’ liberties in the digital
ecosystem. More universal adoption of fair use might be a positive
development. Nevertheless, without strengthening the legal status of
fair use and developing a jurisprudence of fair use rights, we may
end up fighting the battles of the past.

189. See Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 66.

